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Relativists about knowledge ascriptions think thatwhether a particular use of a knowledge-ascribing
sentence, e.g., “Keith knows that the bank is open” is true depends on the epistemic standards at
play in the assessor’s context—viz., the context in which the knowledge ascription is being as-
sessed for truth or falsity. Given that the very same knowledge-ascription can be assessed for
truth or falsity from indefinitely many perspectives, relativism has a striking consequence. When
I ascribe knowledge to someone (e.g., when I say that, at a particular time, “Keith knows that the
bank is open”), what I’ve said does not get a truth-value absolutely, but only relatively. If this
semantic thesis about the word “knows” and its cognates is true, what implications would this
have for epistemology, the philosophical theory of knowledge? The present aim will be to engage
with this mostly unexplored question, and then to consider how the epistemological conclusions
drawn might bear on the plausibility of a relativist semantics for “knows”.
Epistemic Relativism and Relativism about “Knows”
Traditionally, the term “epistemic relativism” has been used to pick out a wide class
of philosophical positions. Rorty (1979), Feyerabend (1987), Hacking (1982), and
Wittgenstein (1969), to name a few, have often been branded “relativists” for main-
taining that (broadly speaking) knowledge, justification, rationality, epistemic norms
and the like are the products of a plurality of conventions and frameworks of as-
sessment and that their authority does not extend beyond the contexts giving rise
to them.1 One very natural way of glossing what it is an epistemic relativist wants to
say is that—in short—knowledge, just like other epistemic standings, depends always
on context. There is no way, as Rorty (1989) put it, to “escape” the various contin-
gencies of the knowledge-ascribing situations in which we find ourselves, no “neutral
standpoint” of epistemic evaluation.
1See Baghramian and Carter (2015 §1). For some recent overviews of various forms of epistemic
relativism, see Baghramian (2004), Boghossian (2006 Ch. 5–6), Carter (2016 Ch. 3-5), Kusch (2010),
Seidel (2014) and Siegel (2013).
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2However, this quick gloss should be initially perplexing: epistemological con-
textualists also fly under the banner that knowledge depends always on context (al-
beit, contexts of a specific sort). Contextualists after all think that whether any given
knowledge-ascribing sentence (e.g., “Keith knows that the bank is open”) is true de-
pends on the speaker’s context2 by depending on the epistemic standards at play when
the speaker is using a knowledge-ascribing sentence. Contextualism is more or less
mainstream in contemporary epistemology. But isn’t epistemic relativism supposed
to be radical?
Given that contextualists, like traditional epistemic relativists, embrace the dictum
(generally construed) that knowledge depends always on context, is contextualism
best understood as a particular version of relativism? Or, alternatively, are traditional
construals of “epistemic relativism” perhaps not as radical or iconoclastic as we’ve been
inclined to think?
According to John MacFarlane (2014), it’s the latter that is the case3. Philosophi-
cally interesting relativism must go a crucial step further than many of the disparate
views that have been branded “epistemic relativism” have gone4. To appreciate why he
thinks so, consider the following two example sentences. (1) is a reference point in the
contextualist literature. (2) is a reference point in the (traditional) relativist literature.
(1). “Keith knows that the bank is open.”
(2). “Galileo knows that the earth revolves around the sun.”
Contextualists (e.g., DeRose (1992); DeRose (2009)) insist that the extension of
“knows” in (1) varies with the context in which (1) is used, and accordingly (1) can
express different propositions and have different truth-conditions in different contexts
(of use)5. For instance, if I utter “Keith knows that the bank is open” in a context where
it is of dire importance whether Keith canmake a withdrawal, (1) comes out true only
if Keith meets very demanding epistemic requirements. And this is because, for the
contextualist, what I’ve said when I utter (1) in a high-stakes context is something like
2And this is because, according to the (attributer) contextualist (e.g., DeRose (1992)), sentences
like “Keith knows that the bank is open” can express different propositions in different conversational
contexts. Cf., however, Williams (2007) for a very different kind of view under the description of “con-
textualism.”
3See also MacFarlane (2005).
4As I note later, MacFarlane regards various views which have been traditionally regarded as “epis-
temic relativism” as better classified as forms of contextualism.
5Jonathan Schaffer (2004) defends a related view, contrastivism, which treats “knows” as invariably
expressing a ternary relation with a slot for a contrast proposition provided by the context. Schaffer
himself regards this position as a ‘sibling’ to contextualism, though it is sometimes regarded as form of
contextualism. Cf., Brogaard (2008) for another non-standard version of contextualism about “knows”
which Brogaard describes as perspectivalism.
3(1*). Keith knowshigh that the bank is open.
And this is a different proposition thanwhat I’ve uttered (using the same sentence)
in relaxed practical circumstances, viz.,
(1**). Keith knowslow that the bank is open.
Likewise, for the contextualist, what goes for (1), goes for (2). I’ve expressed a
different proposition, with different truth-conditions6, when I utter (2) in an academic
context (i.e., Galileo knowslow that the earth revolves around the sun) than I do when
the fate of the world rides on Galileo’s cognitive life (i.e., Galileo knowshigh that the
earth revolves around the sun).
What does the traditional epistemic relativist say about (1) and (2)? By “tradi-
tional” epistemic relativist, I mean: the kind of “Rorty-style” epistemic relativist which
has recently drawn the sustained criticism of Paul Boghossian (2006). As Boghossian
sees it, the traditional epistemic relativist regards (2) as depending on context in the
following way: firstly, the epistemic relativist says there are “no absolute facts” of the
form (2), (i.e., S knows that p.) And so, if a person S’s, knowledge ascriptions are to
have any prospect of being true, we must not construe his utterances of the form
“Galileo knows that the earth revolves around the sun”
as expressing the claim
Galileo knows that the earth revolves around the sun
but rather as expressing the claim.
(2*). According to the epistemic system C, that I, S, accept, Galileo knows
that the earth revolves around the sun.
And, what goes for (2) goes for more mundane knowledge ascriptions, such as
(1), which Boghossian’s epistemic relativist tells us expresses the explicitly relational
proposition:
(1***). According to the epistemic system C, that I, S, accept, Keith knows
that the bank is open.
6For an introduction to truth-conditional semantics, see Heim and Kratzer (1998 §1).
4Putting this all together, DeRose and Rorty can thus agree that statements like (1)
and (2) do not get a truth value, simpliciter, but only relative to a standards parameter
whose value is supplied by the context in which (1) and (2) are used. In this respect,
the views are equally radical, or equally unradical.
Moreover—and this is a pointMacFarlane stresses—both the contextualist and the
traditional epistemic relativist embrace the following thesis with respect to utterance
tokens of (1) and (2):
KnowledgeAscriptionAbsolutism: Utterance tokens of knowledge-ascribing
sentences have their truth values absolutely7.
As MacFarlane sees it, an epistemic relativist of a philosophically interesting8 sort
is going to do more than merely insist that knowledge depends always on context, but
also, to go a step further: to reject Knowledge Ascription Absolutism.
MacFarlane’s semantics for “knows,” which gives what he calls a context of assess-
ment a semantically significant role, takes this further step and denies Knowledge As-
cription Absolutism.
New Epistemic Relativism
This section briefly outlines the key features of “new” epistemic relativism (along the
lines sketched by MacFarlane9), after which the implications for this view in episte-
mological theory will be canvassed.
First some terminology. Following MacFarlane (2014, 60) we can distinguish a
context of assessment from themore familiar notion of a context of use in the following
way:
Context of use: a possible situation in which a sentencemight be used and
where the agent of the context is the user of the sentence.
7Knowledge Ascription Absolutism could just as easily be framed in terms of sentence truth. On
MacFarlane’s view, the kind of relativism that parts ways interestingly from absolutism can be expressed
either in terms of sentence truth (following the semantic framework of Lewis (1980)) or in terms of
propositional truth (following the semantic framework of Kaplan (1989)). As Wright (2007, 262) notes,
a familiar way to capture the kind of relativism MacFarlane is in terms of utterance tokens, understood
as “an actual historic voicing or inscription of a sentence of a certain type” (2007, 262).
8Indeed, as MacFarlane (2014, 33, fn. 5) sees it, the view which Paul Boghossian (2006) recently
(and influentially) challenged, at length, under the description of “epistemic relativism” isn’t really that
interesting. It was really a form of contextualism, modeled on Gilbert Harman’s (1975) moral relativism
which was itself, according to MacFarlane, a kind of contextualism.
9For some similar relativist treatments of “knows,” see Richard (2004). Cf. Kompa (2002) for an
earlier example of a similar view, though one which might be aligned more closely with non-indexical
contextualism. I am focusing on MacFarlane’s presentation of the view here as it has been developed in
the most detail (e.g., 2005, 2009 and 2014) and has generated the most discussion.
5Context of assessment: a possible situation in which a use of a sentence
might be assessed, where the agent of the context is the assessor of the
use of a sentence (ibid., 60).
Whereas relativising knowledge-ascribing sentence truth to merely a context of
use is compatible with Knowledge Ascription Absolutism, relativising knowledge-
ascription sentence truth to a context of assessment is not10.
OnMacFarlane’s view, truth-relativism of the philosophically interesting sort with
respect to “knows” maintains that when I say that “Keith knows the bank is open”,
the truth of what I just said depends (in part) on a context of assessment—viz., this
utterance token gets a truth value only once the standard of the assessor is specified.
Accordingly,my claim that “Keith knows the bank is open” can be at the same time true
relative to a context of assessment (e.g., in which “Bob” is evaluating my claim) where
ordinary “low” standards are in place, yet false relative to a context of assessment in
which “Rene” is evaluating my claim, and where Cartesian standards are in place11.
Since the same knowledge-ascription can be assessed from indefinitely many per-
spectives, there are only perspective-relative answers to the question whether what I
say when I ascribe knowledge to someone is true12. Indeed, even holding fixed the
standards operative in my context, what I say can be true relative to some assessment
contexts and false relative to others. My knowledge ascription does not get its truth
value absolutely13.
In three different places, MacFarlane (2005, 2011, 2014) has defended a “master
argument” for an assessment-sensitive semantics for knowledge attributions. Here is
the core strand of argument he’s defended on each occasion:
Master Argument for Assessment Sensitive Semantics for Knowledge Attri-
butions
10See, for instance, MacFarlane (2014, pp. 49, 67, 73, fn. 3, 89, passim).
11ForMacFarlane, then, the answer to the question of why contextualism, as well as Rorty-style epis-
temic relativism, is not on the interesting side of the relativist’s line is that while the contextualist can, no
less than the relativist, recognize a “standards” parameter, for the contextualist, its value will be supplied
by the context of use, whereas the relativist (proper) takes it to be supplied completely independently of
the context of use, by the context of assessment. See Baghramian and Carter (2015 §5) for an overview.
See also MacFarlane (2007), MacFarlane (2012a) and MacFarlane (2012b).
12See, for example, MacFarlane (2012a). Independent of the specification of an assessor’s standard,
my claim that Keith knows that the bank is open simply lacks a truth-value much as, by comparison, an
indexical expression such as “I have been to Tahiti” simply lacks a truth-value independent of contextual
facts about the context of use (i.e. which pick out to whom “I” refers).
13For two accessible overview discussions of MacFarlane’s view, see Baghramian and Carter (2015
§5) and Carter (2016 Ch. 7).
6(3). Standard invariantism, contextualism and SSI all have advantages
and weaknesses.
(4). Relativism preserves the advantages while avoiding the disadvan-
tages.
(5). Therefore, prima facie, we should be relativists about knowledge at-
tributions.
Premise (3) is more or less uncontroversial. One interesting line of question is
whether, premise (4) of MacFarlane’s master argument is true14. For the present pur-
poses, though, we can set this aside.
The question that will be of interest now is: if we do have good reason to embrace a
truth-relativist semantics for “knows,” then how should this affect our epistemological
theorising? What is the upshot for this view in epistemology—viz., that is, of giving
“knows” a semantic treatment such that knowledge ascriptions do not have their truth
values absolutely? This is the question to which the remainder of this disucssion will
be concerned.
Implications of Relativism
Equivalence and reduction
Knowledge is the central subject matter around which epistemological theorizing is
organized15. If “knows” gets a relativist treatment, we should expect that other epist-
memic notions, which are connected in various ways with knowledge, will as well.
Here I’ll consider epistemic notions which stand (modulo certain substantive com-
mitments) in equivalence, reductive and normative relations (respecitvely) to “knows”
and its cognates.
Other epistemic items Relation to knowledge
Evidence Equivalence (E=K)
Knowledge-how Reductive (Intellectualism)
Knowledge norms Normative
14For some recent criticism on this point, see Cappelen and Hawthorne (2010), Carter (2016 Ch.
7–8), Stanley (2005 Ch. 7), and Stanley (2015). Cf., Partee (2004).
15The longstanding concern with the project of analysing propositional knowledge is a testament to
this. For an overview, see Ichikawa and Steup (2014).
7Take, as a starting point, a very tight conceptual connection: Williamson’s (2000)
knowledge-evidence equivalence thesis, E=K, according to which “knowledge, and
only knowledge, constitutes evidence … S’s evidence [is] S’s knowledge, for every in-
dividual or community S in any possible situation16.”
E=K is controversial, though the proposal has become increasingly attractive for
those sympathetic with the knowledge-first approach in epistemology. Suppose one
combinesE=K withMacFarlane-style relativism about “knows.” In short, the relativist
about “knows” had better be prepared to embrace the view that evidence ascriptions
are assessment-sensitive, or give upE=K. Consider, after all, that the proponent ofE=K
is submitting that the claim that S’s evidence includes E if, and only if, S knows E is
extensionally correct in all metaphysically possible worlds17. If knowledge ascriptions
are assessment-sensitive, but evidence ascriptionsweren’t, then, possibly, a claimof the
form “S knows E” could be true as uttered at c1 and assessed from c2, even when “S’s
evidence includes E” is false as uttered at c2 and assessed at c2, a result that stands in
tensionwith theE=K proponent’s commitment to regarding the claim that S’s evidence
includes E if, and only if, S knows E as extensionally correct in all metaphysically
possible worlds.
The epistemological “bleedover” froman assessment-sensitive semantics for “knows”
to other epistemic notions connected to knowledge isn’t limited to equivalence rela-
tions. Let’s consider now a reductive relation, one embraced by intellectualists about
knowledge-how18.
Gilbert Ryle’s (1945) distinction between knowing-how and knowing-that had
for decades been taken for granted. But this is no longer so. Intellectualists about
knowing-how, following Stanley and Williamson (2001), insist that knowing how to
do something is a species of propositional knowledge—viz., that knowing-how is a
kind of knowing-that19. As Stanley (2011) puts the core intellectualist insight:
[…] you know how to ride a bicycle if and only if you know in what way
you could ride a bicycle. But you know in what way you could ride a bicy-
cle if and only if you possess some propositional knowledge, viz. know-
ing, of a certain way w which is a way in which you could ride a bicycle,
that w is a way in which you could ride a bicycle (2001, 209).
Intellectualism isn’t for everyone20. But let’s consider: what is the state of play
for philosophers who embrace intellectualism about knowledge-how as well as an
16Williamson (2000, 183). See also Williamson (1997).
17Compare: Ichikawa and Steup (2014), who make a similar point regarding the commitments of
proponents of K=JTB.
18Stanley and Williamson (2001); Stanley (2011a).
19Stanley (2011b, 207); Stanley (2011a, 122), passim.
20For a sample of some recent criticisms of intellectualism, see Noë (2005), Toribio (2008), Cath
8assessment-sensitive semantics for propositional knowledge ascriptions? Again, in
short: it is hard to see knowledge-how ascriptions would not be assessment-sensitive,
too. Suppose, for reductio, that knowing how to do something is just a kind of propo-
sitional knowledge and that the truth-conditions for knowing how to do something
(e.g., as in the case of attributions of the form “Irina knows how to perform a salchow”)
are not assessment sensitive, but the truth-conditions for proposition knowledge are.
Sowe can suppose that “Irina knows that p” has assessment-sensitive truth conditions,
where p is a proposition specifying a way, w, which is a way in which Irina could per-
form a salchow, that w is a way in which Irina could perform a salchow. This would
be perplexing to say the least. One way to make this point is in terms of absolute truth
values. If I antecedently embrace intellectualism and assert “Irina knows how to per-
forma salchow” I regardmyself as having said something that is true if and only if Irina
knows some proposition. If my ascription to Irina of knowledge of that proposition
does not get an absolute truth value, then it’s puzzling to see how my knowledge-how
ascription to Irina would. Thus, for intellectualists about knowledge-how, no less than
proponents of E=K, it looks like a MacFarlane-style semantics for “knows” generates
further epistemological commitments.
Normativity and value
I’ve suggested elsewhere that similar arguments can be made in the case of reductive
accounts of understanding-why, and even (though perhaps more controversially) for
certain accounts of epistemic justification21. I want to now consider the implications
for an assessment-sensitive semantics for “knows” within the context of epistemolog-
ical debates about epistemic norms and epistemic value. Let’s begin with norms.
Here are two which are popular nowadays: the knowledge norms of assertion and
action.
“One must: assert that p only if one knows p” (Williamson 2000, 243).
“Treat the proposition that p as a reason for acting only if you know that
p” (Hawthorne and Stanley 2008, 578).
(2011); Poston (2009); Carter and Pritchard (2015a); Carter and Pritchard (2015b); Carter and Pritchard
(Forthcoming). For an idiosyncratic version of intellectualism which embraces that knowing how to do
something is in virtue of propositional attitudes, but which does not embrace propositionalism, the thesis
that knowledge-how is a propositional knowledge relation, see Bengson and Moffet (2011).
21See Carter (2014) for the argument that a MacFarlane-style semantics for “knows” must be
paired (for the reductivist about understanding-why) with an assessment-sensitive semantics for
understanding-why ascriptions. I also, in Carter (2016 Ch. 8), make a more detailed argument for
why a relativist treatment of “knows” has a range of other implications in epistemology, beyond some of
the highlights I’m able to cover here.
9If we assume ex anteMacFarlane’s semantics for “knows,” then proponents of the
knowledge norms for action and assertion face an interesting position: they will be
forced to embrace a view we can call normative non-absolutism with respect to asser-
tion and action.
Call normative absolutism the view that a particular speech act, at a particular
time, has its normative properties absolutely. For example, if I violate the norm gov-
erning permissible assertion by asserting a at t1, then (on normative absolutism) it’s
not the case that, at t2, my utterance token a can “no longer have violated” the norm
of assertion at t1. And vice versa.
Denying normative absolutism has its costs. As Gareth Evans (1985) puts the
point:
Just as we use the terms ‘good’ and ‘bad’, ‘obligatory’ and ‘permitted’ to
make an assessment, once and for all, of non-linguistic actions, so we
use the term ‘correct’ to make a once-and-for-all assessment of speech
acts …. if a theory of reference permits a subject to deduce merely that
a particular utterance is now correct but later will be incorrect, it cannot
assist the subject in deciding what to say, nor in interpreting the remarks
of others.
If “knows” gets a relativist treatment, then—at least in so far as we are inclined
to embrace the knowledge norm of assertion—there can be no assessment, once and
for all, of assertions22. And what goes for the knowledge norm of assertion goes for
knowledge norms of action as well as belief, practical reasoning and the like. In each
case, one can embrace such a knowledge norm, alongside a relativist treatment for
“knows” only by giving up normative absolutism.
While knowledge norms are often embraced by those sympathetic to the knowledge-
first approach, a more general axiological insight about knowledge is embraced even
more widely23. The idea is, put crudely, that knowledge is more epistemically valuable
than mere true opinion. Call this the value insight. As Duncan Pritchard (2009, 19)
puts it, if we didn’t take something like the value insight for granted in epistemology,
22While a stock objection to truth-relativist semantics, more generally, is that an implication is that
assertions are not once-and-for all assessable, the typical sort of relativist response doesn’t have purchase
against the tension just described between a relativist treatment for “knows” and the knowledge norm
of assertion, specifically. For instance, in response to Evans’ challenge, MacFarlane embraces a kind
of “meet the challenge” norm for assertion which he thinks preserves the integrity of assertion. See
MacFarlane (2003). Cf., Kölbel (2004, 308). However, redeploying this kind of move is an option only if
one isn’t already committed to a particular norm of assertion. So, for one who antecedently embraces the
knowledge norm of assertion, a truth-relativist semantics for “knows” is going to have, as a consequence,
normative non-absolutism in the case of assertion.
23Cf., Kvanvig (2003) for criticism.
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“then it would be simply mysterious why knowledge has been the focus of so much
of epistemological theorising, rather than some other epistemic standing like justified
true belief.”
One interesting implication a relativist treatment of “knows” would have, for epis-
temological theorizing, is that it’s not clear how the value insight can continue to be
maintained. The insight, unpacked more carefully, is that for any given proposition,
it’s better (from a purely epistemic or intellectual point of view) to know that propo-
sition than to merely truly believe the proposition but fail to know it24.
SupposeA says “Keith knows that the bank is open.” The value insight implies that
if this claim is true, then the state of affairs in virtue of which it is true is more epis-
temically valuable than is the state of affairs of Keith’s merely truly believing that the
bank is open, but not knowing this. A relativist semantics for “knows” implies that,
since the truth of whatA just said about Keith’s mental life can be assessed from indef-
initely many perspectives, there are only perspective-relative answers to the question
whether the state of affairs characterizing Keith’s mental life is more valuable than
were Keith to merely truly belief that the bank was open.
New Relativism: Wider Epistemological Implications
The previous section outlined several specific ways in which a relativist semantics for
“knows” would have some consequences, more broadly, in epistemological theory. I
want to close by gesturing to a bigger-picture issue.
Compare epistemologywith paleontology, which studies life prior to theHolocene
epoch, primarily by scientifically studying the fossil record. Paleontology is organized
around certain rules about how inferences are best drawn to conclusions about ancient
life. If paleontologists began playing by very different rules—suppose they began re-
lying on tea leaves more so than the fossil record—paleontology would no longer be
valuable in telling us with accuracy about ancient life. The value of the practice, in
light of these new rules, wouldn’t sustain the practice.
In recent work, John Turri (Forthcoming) argues that a rule normatively sustains
a practice when the value achieved by following the rule explains why agents continue
following that rule, thus establishing and sustaining a pattern of activity.
The practice of epistemology, or epistemological inquiry is, like paleontology,
also organized around certain rules—the rules which epistemologists take for granted
when engaging in typical first-order debates. Imagine the nearest world where episte-
mologists (replete with their dispositions to do epistemology as usual) wake up to find
themselves convinced by arguments for a relativist semantics for “knows.” Epistemol-
24For discussion on this point, see Carter, Jarvis, and Rubin (2013).
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ogists, having woken upwith this revelation, accordingly reject Knowledge Ascription
Absolutism. Suddenly, the rules change dramatically.
There would be no point, for example, in continuing to follow one of the most
basic rules which sustains the practice of epistemology: that universal generalizations
about knowledge stand to be legitimitely challenged by pointing to imagined knowl-
edge cases. There is, as Williamson (2007, 180) puts it, a kind of “cognitive weight
analytic philosophers rest on thought experiments.” And analytic epistemology is a
paradigmatic example of an area in analytic philosophy where thought experiments
are relied upon25.
But epistemologists, havingwokenwith commitments to rejectingKnowledgeAs-
cription Absolutism, would have little reason to continue playing by such rules any-
more. For example, even if most individuals agree that, within a given thought exper-
iment T, a subject S‘s claim that Keith knows that the bank is open is true, this could
not in itself constitute evidence one way or another for whether Keith really knows
that the bank is open. After all, given that the relativist semantics for “knows” rejects
Knowledge Ascription Absolutism, this isn’t the sort of thing for which individuals’
willingness to attribute knowledge would be evidence. At any rate, there would be no
reason to rest much (as Williamson says) “cognitive weight” on what individuals say
about such cases like T, to the end of theorizing about the nature of knowledge.
Putting this all together: if we were to suppose that epistemologists embraced
MacFarlane’s semantics for “knows,” we should expect them to find little point in car-
rying on by following the same rules. The “new rules” would not normatively sustain,
in Turri’s sense, the practice of theorizing about knowledge in the way epistemologists
traditionally have.
Trivially, the current rules do normatively sustain the practice. The theoretical
value achieved by following the rules characteristic of epistemology plausibly explains
why epistemologists continue to pursue traditional projects. Some practices are more
valuable than others. To the extent that the practice of epistemology (along tradi-
tional lines) is a valuable one—replete with the kind of rules epistemologists take for
granted in practice—we have either (i) prima facie reason to be skeptical that a rela-
tivist semantics for “knows” is tractable; or, alternatively, (ii) prima facie reason to be
skeptical that our theory of knowledge attributions should inform the epistemologist’s
theory of knowledge26.27
25This point is perhaps on clearest display in the post-Gettier literature. See here Shope (1983) for a
review.
26For an argument in favour of this kind of conclusion, see Hazlett (2010). Cf. Carter (2016 Ch.
8–9).
27Thanks to Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa and Brian Rabern for helpful comments.
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